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I.    INTRODUCTION 
Outer space is, for the lack of a better term, big.1  Though the same holds 
true for the volume of space2 around Earth, inadequacies in the current 
body of international space jurisprudence and the finite options available for 
satellite acquisition services present a unique threat to the long-term 
sustainability of geospace.3  Foundationally, the architects of the Corpus Juris 
Spatialis—the five multilateral space treaties—perceived space as an infinite 
ocean of opportunity and sought to provide an equitable regime for 
unabated exploration, use, and enjoyment of the cosmos.4  Anyone capable 
and willing was—and remains—free to benefit from any manner of activity 
 
1. DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 76 (1979). 
2. This Comment focuses exclusively on “geospace,” a region above Earth in which objects 
maintain relatively consistent orbits with the aid of Earth’s gravitational pull.  See Bhavya Lal &  
Emily Nightingale, Where is Space? And Why Does That Matter?, in SPACE TRAFFIC MGMT. CONF., 
Paper 16 at 1 n.1 (2014) (delineating between various regions of space); see also R.A.N. Araujo et al., 
Sphere of Influence and Gravitational Capture Radius: A Dynamical Approach, 391 MONTHLY NOTICES 
ROYAL ASTRONOMICAL SOC’Y 675, 675 (2008) (“The concept of the sphere of influence [is] . . . the 
region in which the gravitational influence of a body prevails over the gravitational influence of other 
bodies.”).  The majority of space activity is concentrated in this “bubble” around Earth.  See infra 
Appendix. 
3. See Mary Button, Note, Cleaning Up Space: The Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty as a Model 
for Regulating Orbital Debris, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 539, 539 (2013) (“The space near 
Earth, the orbit, is different from any other place in the universe due to its proximity to our planet and 
the impact humans have on the area.  Humanity needs to stop thinking of the planet’s orbit as just a 
part of the vastness of space[.]”). 
4. See Rep. of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on Its Sixty-Second Session, 
at 50, U.N. Doc. A/74/20 (2019) [hereinafter COPUOS, Sixty-Second] (“[O]uter space should remain 
an operationally stable and safe environment that is maintained for peaceful purposes and open for 
exploration, use and international cooperation by current and future generations, in the interest of 
all . . . .”). 
2
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in space, so long as the spacefarer operates through peaceful means.5  Yet 
conceptually, “outer space” is distinguishable from “geospace” in that 
geospace is slowly approaching a modern-day tragedy of the commons.6 
Within the region of geospace, the prime utility lies with satellite orbits—
a finite commodity.7  Since 1957, mankind has placed approximately 
9,453 objects into Earth orbit.8  Annually, geospace acquires an average of 
150 satellites9 providing valuable scientific data and transmission services 
vital to our development on Earth.10  This steady accumulation accelerated 
 
5. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. IV, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 
610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (prohibiting States Parties from placing weapons in 
orbit or using celestial bodies for ill-intentioned purposes). 
6. The tragedy of the commons occurs when utilization of land is unbounded, and persons 
exploit the land to the extent of their own self-interest with remorseless disregard of the possibility that 
others might do the same, despite the resource’s finite utility.  See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1248 (1968) (concluding legal solutions rather than technical solutions will 
prevent a tragedy of the commons); see also Benjamin David Landry, A Tragedy of the Anticommons: The 
Economic Inefficiencies of Space Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 523, 577 (2013) (“The commercialization of 
outer space is suffering from a tragedy of the anticommons.  No state or private entity has been willing 
to bear the cost of commercialization because international law prohibits national and, potentially, 
private appropriation[.]”); Scott J. Shackelford, Governing the Final Frontier: A Polycentric Approach in 
Managing Space Weaponization and Debris, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 429, 443 (2014) [hereinafter Shackelford, 
Governing the Final Frontier] (“Technological advancements and resource scarcity are driving interest in 
the space commons, yet thus far governance has failed to keep pace.”); Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy 
of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 111 (2009) [hereinafter Shackelford, 
Tragedy of the Common Heritage] (“[I]n particular the communal property principle of the [Common 
Heritage of Mankind] are under pressure with the need for greater private economic development.  
With resources becoming increasingly scarce and technology advancing to meet surging demand, 
longstanding principles of communal property in the international commons will either be 
reinterpreted or rewritten outright.”). 
7. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Sci. & Tech. Subcomm. on Its 
Fifty-Fourth Session, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2017/CRP.12 (2017) [hereinafter COPUOS, 
Fifty-Fourth].  Accordingly, in support of Mary Button, it is the author’s view that international space 
law should be bifurcated, with separate regimes for outer space and geospace, yet for markedly different 
reasons.  See generally Button, supra note 3, at 539–40 (advocating for a protocol to the space treaties 
that mirrors the Antarctic Treaty’s Montreal Protocol).  Contra Definition and Delimitation of Outer 
Space and the Character and Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit, 2001 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 12, § C(4) at 721 (“[D]elimiting outer space is not necessary.  
No legal or practical problems have arisen in the absence of such a definition.”). 
8. As of April 30, 2020, roughly 5,841 objects occupy geospace.  See Online Index of  
Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/index.jspx?lf_id= (follow “To Search the Online Index, 
Click Here,” then toggle filters) (last Apr. 30, 2020). 
9. COPUOS, Fifty-Fourth, supra note 7, at 9. 
10. Id. at 12 (“[Peaceful usage of outer space] is also integral in contributing to governance 
mechanisms in addressing a wide array of global problems, for example, monitoring climate change 
3
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abruptly with the advent of satellite constellations.  In 2019 alone, 
457 satellites were added to the geospace environment.  This only 
exacerbates the accumulation of space debris, arguably the most dangerous 
byproduct of space activity.11  And despite the ample treaty bodies, the 
textual vagaries12 present spacefarers an opportunity to devour the usability 
of geospace without internalizing the negative externalities of their usage.13  
In consideration of our global dependence on satellite-based 
communication, remote sensing, and simply having a gateway to outer 
space, the current legal framework is unsustainable and requires binding 
international cooperation rather than voluntary, nebulous guidelines.14 
 
and providing early warnings for natural disasters through the use of satellite images, supporting local 
development through connecting communities to the internet, and providing the infrastructure 
necessary for development in information technology industry.”). 
11. See STUFF IN SPACE, stuffin.space (last visited Apr. 26, 2020) (click on any dot, then click 
“Find all objects from this launch.”  Or, click “Groups” to view various satellite constellations) 
(providing an interactive interface to view all current objects, including space debris and non-functional 
objects, in Earth orbit). 
12. In this context, spacefaring nations take advantage of the gaps and ill-defined language of 
the space law treaties to skirt the responsibility of protecting the global commons.  Essentially, the 
treaties are exploited, not necessarily space.  Though the byproduct of this interpretive exploitation 
and the lack of holistically internalized mitigation procedures exhibits the threat to the geospace 
commons.  See generally Frans G. von der Dunk, Too-Close Encounter of the Third Party Kind: Will the Liability 
Convention Stand the Test of the Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33 Collision?, 28 SPACE CYBER & TELECOMM. L. 199 
(2010) (discussing the difficulties of assigning liability for satellite collision due to vagaries within the 
Liability Convention and failure to comply with the Registration Convention). 
13. Due to the inability to appropriate property in space and the absence of resource use 
delimitation, any entity with the financial means can exploit geospace resources.  Landry, supra note 6, 
527–28; see also Joseph Kurt, Note, Triumph of the Space Commons: Addressing the Impending Space Debris 
Crisis Without an International Treaty, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 305, 309 (2015) 
(criticizing China’s blatant use of an anti-satellite missile to destroy its own faulty satellite). 
14. The tragedy of the commons occurs when utilization of land is unbounded, and persons 
exploit the land to the extent of their own self-interest with remorseless disregard of the possibility that 
others might do the same despite the resource’s finite utility.  See Hardin, supra note 6, at 1248 
(concluding legal solutions rather than technical solutions will prevent a tragedy of the commons); see 
also Landry, supra note 6, at 577 (“The commercialization of outer space is suffering from a tragedy of 
the anticommons.  No state or private entity has been willing to bear the cost of commercialization 
because international law prohibits national and, potentially, private appropriation[.]”); Shackelford, 
Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 111 (“[I]n particular the communal property principle of 
the [Common Heritage of Mankind] are under pressure with the need for greater private economic 
development.  With resources becoming increasingly scarce and technology advancing to meet surging 
demand, longstanding principles of communal property in the international commons will either be 
reinterpreted or rewritten outright.”); Shackelford, Governing the Final Frontier, supra note 6, at 443 
(“Technological advancements and resource scarcity are driving interest in the space commons, yet 
thus far governance has failed to keep pace.”). 
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To cure a tragedy of the commons, Garrett Hardin’s classic economic 
solution entails either (1) establishing articulable property rights or 
(2) promulgating coercive regulatory regimes.15  International law poses 
obvious difficulties for implementing such solutions due to the contractual 
nature of treaties.16  Fortunately, most launching states and indirect 
beneficiary nation-states consented to the Outer Space Treaty (OST) and 
the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects (Liability Convention), with the continued accession of remaining 
nation-states.17  In terms of the international community’s sentiments 
towards rectifying environmental degradation, protocols to the OST and 
Liability Convention could conceivably reflect the changing attitudes toward 
sustainability and emerging international custom.18  Yet any Hardin-esque 
solution affecting a new property regime would directly contravene the 
object and purpose of the Corpus Juris Spatialis.19  As such, a workable 
 
15. See Hardin, supra note 6, at 1247 (discussing the behavioral effects of taxation and private 
property regimes). 
16. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 9, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(denoting the consent of all States requirement to adopt a treaty). 
17. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its 
Fifty-Seventh Session, at 10, U.N. Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.3 (2018) [COPUOS, 
Fifty-Seventh]. 
18. Cf. Kurt, supra note 13, at 320–22 (evidencing international environmental cooperation 
signals hope for restoration even without treaties); David Tan, Towards a New Regime for the Protection of 
Outer Space as the “Province of All Mankind”, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 145, 177–79 (2000) (extending the 
emerging custom of sustainable development to the space environment).  The global commons of 
Antarctica faced concerns similar to those in outer space, and the OST is modeled after a significant 
portion of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).  See Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra 
note 6, at 141 (“The governing treaties of space law share many similarities with . . . the ATS.”).  The 
ATS also prohibits sovereign appropriation and weapons proliferation and covenants to ensure any 
usage be purely scientific in nature and equitably shared with the global community.  The Antarctic 
Treaty art. I–III, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.  Analogous to the OST, the ATS failed 
to provision for sustainable usage and once mining operations threatened its environmental integrity, 
a protocol to the ATS was annexed to arrest the potential destruction of Antarctica.  Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 7, Oct. 4, 1991, T.I.A.S. No. 98-114, 20 I.L.M. 
1455 [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]. 
19. Holistically, the object and purpose of the Corpus Spatialis prohibits sovereign nations from 
asserting ownership over any location or volume of space in the interest of maintaining a commons 
for all of mankind.  E.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at pmbl. & art. II (“Reaffirming the 
importance of international co-operation in the field of activities in the peaceful exploration and use 
of outer space . . . .”).  In spite of the OST’s anti-appropriation clause, the International 
Telecommunications Union is tasked with the responsibility to: 
[E]ffect allocation of bands of the radio-frequency spectrum, the allotment of radio frequencies 
and the registration of radio-frequency assignments and, for space services, of any associated 
orbital position in the geostationary-satellite orbit or of any associated characteristics of satellites 
5
Vollmer: The Right Stuff in Geospace
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
776 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:771 
solution must balance contemporary global interests with intergenerational 
equity.20 
This Comment proposes a regulatory solution through the 
implementation of a conceptual liability regime.  This proposal finds support 
through emerging custom and the values systems which inform the 
perceived utility of the global commons for all of mankind.  It proffers a 
workable solution that allows continued accessibility to geospace while 
simultaneously coercing spacefaring entities and Earth-side beneficiaries 
alike to incorporate reasonable care, aggressive debris clean-up solutions, 
and binding mitigation procedures.21  Sovereign nations and private 
corporations need not abate their participation in geospace but must not 
encroach humanity’s future enjoyment of the “final frontier.”22  This 
proposal addresses the coterminous interests of stakeholders, incorporating 
equitable benefit-sharing without placing undue liability on the space 
majors, such as the United States, Russia, and China.23 
 
in other orbits, in order to avoid harmful interference between radio stations of different 
countries. 
International Telecommunications Union Const. art 1(2)(a) adopted by Plenipotentiary Conference 
(Minneapolis, 1998). 
20. Cf. Tan, supra note 18, at 175 (“Although the content of the ‘province of all mankind’ is 
disputed, it nevertheless, at a minimum, imposes a duty upon states to use outer space in a manner that 
jeopardizes neither the interests of present spacefaring states nor the potential interests of other 
states.”). 
21. Many mitigation standards exist, but the United Nations guidelines are non-binding.  See 
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, COMPENDIUM: SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION 
STANDARDS ADOPTED BY STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 56 (2018) [hereinafter 
COMPENDIUM: SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION], http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/s
d/Space_Debris_Compendium_COPUOS_21_sep_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRP9-74UH] 
(“Through resolution 62/217, the United Nations General Assembly invited Member States of the 
United Nations to implement those voluntary guidelines through relevant national mechanisms ‘to the 
greatest extent feasible,’ through space debris mitigation practices and procedures.”).  Though 
nation-states have domestic laws, those laws still lack enforcement mechanisms and do not create any 
duty to mitigate the further creation of space debris.  E.g., 51 U.S.C. § 31501 (2010) (enabling NASA 
administrator to take steps to reduce risk of orbital debris).  The United States, for example, grants 
regulatory authority to various executive agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), to regulate space activities under its authority.  See 14 C.F.R. § 400.1 (2019) 
(enabling FAA to license space launches and re-entries); 47 C.F.R. § 25.108 (2018) (enabling FCC to 
allocate satellite radio frequencies); 15 C.F.R. § 960.1 (2006) (enabling NOAA to regulate licenses for 
private remote sensing satellites). 
22. Shackelford, Governing the Final Frontier, supra note 6, at 430; Star Trek: The Original Series 
(NBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 1966). 
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First, a separate regime must be established for geospace.  Part II 
provides a historical overview of space law, exploring the progressive 
delimitation of airspace which carefully balanced the interests of 
stakeholders.  Second, it is crucial to understand the vulnerabilities of our 
aging body of space law, and the specific challenges arising from the 
privatization of space activity.  Part III examines the textual limitations of 
the treaties, domestic statutory schemes, and the voluntary international 
standards for space debris mitigation.  Third, equal weight must be given to 
both public and private interests, but any rights conferred necessitates 
counterbalancing those duties.  Part IV analyzes what motivates 
nation-states to consent to binding international legal conventions and 
combines those behavioral realities with Hardin’s coercion theory to 
effectuate a practical liability regime.  Finally, environmental security 
discourse must include the rising threat of space debris.  Part V concludes 
with a summary of current decontamination efforts and the path of least 
resistance to a global liability regime. 
II.    THE PROGRESSIVE DELIMITATION OF AEROSPACE 
The Cold War marked a monumental shift in modern space law 
development, but scholars often overlook its true beginnings.24  Indeed, the 
primordial maxim of ad coelum et ad infernos25 marks the genuine 
 
23.  
International cooperation, while taking into particular account the needs of developing countries, 
should aim, inter alia, at the following goals, considering their need for technical assistance and 
rational and efficient allocation of financial and technical resources: (a) Promoting the 
development of space science and technology and of its applications; (b) Fostering the 
development of relevant and appropriate space capabilities in interested States; (c) Facilitating the 
exchange of expertise and technology among States on a mutually acceptable basis. 
G.A. Res. 51/122, annex ¶ 5, Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs 
of Developing Countries (Dec. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Benefits Declaration]. 
24. See Landry, supra note 6, at 528 (signifying Cold War tensions as primary impetus for space 
law); Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 143 (stating Sputnik initiated the 
development of law of outer space); Daniel A. Porras, Comment, The “Common Heritage” of Outer Space: 
Equal Benefits for Most of Mankind, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 143, 147–48 (2006) (chronicling President 
Eisenhower’s response to the Sputnik launch, deeming space exploration as the mark of military 
superiority). 
25. Translated, the maxim, while not binding law, expresses the generalization that one owns 
everything up to the sky and down to the center of Earth.  Ad coelum et ad inferos, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); J. Joseph Cummings, Ownership and Control of Airspace, 37 MARQ. L. REV. 
176, 176 (1953). 
7
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commencement of space jurisprudence.  As meager as the delimitation of 
airspace seems, the historical progression of boundary demarcation resulted 
out of necessity. 
Prior to the 1900s, private property owners possessed an absolute right 
to their property’s superadjacent airspace.26  After the advent of sustained 
aeronautical flight, the United States Congress promulgated the Air 
Commerce Act of 1926 (ACA), establishing the foundations of our modern 
aerospace transportation network.27  The ACA, as amended by the Civil 
Aeronautics Act of 1938,28 prescribes national airspace as part of the public 
domain.  Some viewed this demarcation as a subversion of the common law 
property maxim and challenged the Act’s constitutionality in United States v. 
Causby.29  In Causby, the Supreme Court rejected ad coelum et ad infernos, 
deeming it unworkable for modern aviation.30  The Court reasoned that 
economic development justified a delineation between private and public 
rights, but only if public usage did not render private property 
uninhabitable.31  This exemplifies the first delimitation of airspace rights,32 
which balanced the interests of the competing stakeholders to ensure the 
best use of the commons at issue.33 
Consistent with the international community, the ACA also granted the 
United States government exclusive sovereign authority over the nation’s 
 
26. See Cummings, supra note 25, at 176 n.1 (discussing the first reported case to solidify the 
principle that a property owner is entitled to the land as well as everything above and below). 
27. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568. 
28. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, ch. 601, § 1107(i)(3), 52 Stat. 973, 1028. 
29. Private landowners equated sovereignty over the airspace commons as a regulatory taking.  
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946) (“The problem presented is whether respondents’ 
property was taken, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by frequent and regular flights of 
army and navy aircraft over respondents’ land at low altitudes.”). 
30. Id. at 261. 
31. See id. (“[T]hat doctrine has no place in the modern world.  The air is a public 
highway . . . .  Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless 
trespass suits. . . .  To recognize such private claims to airspace would clog these highways, seriously 
interfere with their control and development in the public interest[.]”).  The boundary of navigable 
airspace is at an altitude where aircraft pass without unduly interfering the subjacent land or safety of 
the aircraft in question.  49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2018). 
32. The boundary of navigable airspace is at an altitude where aircraft pass without unduly 
interfering the subjacent land or safety of the aircraft in question.  49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2018).   
33. See Chad J. Pomeroy, All Your Air Right Are Belong to Us, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
277, 290 n.77 (2015) (“[The Causby court] chose a middle ground, limiting air rights to those that are 
within ‘the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.’”). 
8
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airspace.34  In the interest of national security, this second demarcation of 
sovereign jurisdiction over superadjacent airspace35 empowered 
nation-states to dictate the permissible uses of their navigable airspace, while 
leaving international airspace free for peaceful uses.36  Yet, unlike the ACA, 
jurists avoided declaring any substantive separation between air space and 
outer space.37  Once engineers designed aircraft capable of crossing over 
into “the ether . . . beyond the control of subadjacent states,”38 
commentaries opined that once free from the atmosphere, any subsequent 
conquest of the great beyond invoked consideration of “the heritage of 
mankind.”39  The international community thus loosely defined the third 
delimitation, the beginning of space, at the Kármán Line.40  With the 
momentum of consensus on the upper limit of national sovereignty, the 
 
34. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, ch. 344 § 6, 44 Stat. 568, 572 (current 
version at 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2018)). 
35. Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1–2, Apr. 14, 1947, 61 Stat. 1180, 
15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
36. Id. at art. 5.  Foreign nationals can still obtain permission for “innocent passage” if 
necessary.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, pt. II § 3 art. 17–19, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (stating “innocent passage of territorial waters” is applicable 
to ships and aircraft). 
37. Russian jurist, Zarzar Valentin Ananevich, did not believe in assigning definitions for 
international altitude zones, leaving such up to principles of sovereignty.  Stephen E. Doyle, A Concise 
History of Space Law: 1910–2009, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
53RD IISL COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, YOUNG SCHOLARS SESSION 2 (Mark J. 
Sundahl & V. Gopalakrishnan eds., 2010). 
38. Id. at 4.  The first scholarly writing with a strict focus on space law presupposed “the entire 
area beyond the atmosphere would have to be considered free territory both on technical grounds 
founded on the law of nature and for reasons of legal construction and policy.”  Welf Heinrich, Air 
Law and Space, 5 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 11, 67 (1958). 
39. Doyle, supra note 37, at 4. 
40. Despite the extensive debate on the true boundary and Jonathan C. McDowell’s recent 
proposal to reduce its altitude, in the interest of brevity, the 100-kilometer Kármán Line will represent 
the demarcation for this Comment.  Compare Button, supra note 3, at 541, with Jonathan C. McDowell, 
The Edge of Space: Revisiting the Karman Line, 151 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 668 (2018) (cataloguing the 
arguments surrounding the Kármán Line and proposing the demarcation of space lies at an altitude of 
eighty kilometers).  The United Nations has taken a firm stance regarding the location of 
geosynchronous orbit (GSO).  In 1976, a convention comprised of the equatorial nation-states of 
Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire and Brazil attempted to claim 
sovereignty over GSO, asserting the valuable region was a natural resource of Earth.  Declaration of 
the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, adopted Dec. 3, 1976 (Bogota), available at 
https://bogotadeclaration.wordpress.com/declaration-of-1976/ [https://perma.cc/F9D7-VQVU].  
However, the international community expressly rejected the countries’ claims because they defied the 
non-appropriation clause of the OST.  Ferdinand Onwe Agama, Effects of the Bogota Declaration on the 
Legal Status of Geostationary Orbit in International Space Law, 8 NNAMDI AZIKIWE U.J. INT’L L. & JURIS. 
24, 25–27 (2017). 
9
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international community next looked toward a legal regime for the 
governance of space, but motivations were limited to prohibiting the 
weaponization of space.41 
A. The Outer Space Treaty 
When the Soviet Union successfully placed Sputnik I into orbit in 1957, 
preeminent legal minds were blinded by the national security issues 
implicated by the “space race”; tempering fears of a potential “star war” 
took priority over any other potentially dangerous situation in space.42  
Cognizant of the potential military utility of the space commons,43 the 
United Nations formed the Standing Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1959.44  Primarily, COPUOS focused attention 
on maintaining peace in regions beyond the immediate control of 
subadjacent nations and a means to ensure that spacefaring nations could 
not appropriate any area of space out of neocolonial self-interest.45  In 1967, 
these goals materialized with the OST, the first internationalized document 
for space law.46 
The object and purpose of the OST aims to ensure a global commons in 
the interest of mankind for scientific research and economic 
development,47 while simultaneously restricting the militarization of 
space.48  The text expressly declared that “[o]uter space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim 
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by other means.”49  While 
 
41. See Doyle, supra note 37, at 1, 4 (“[O]ver flights of national territory at any speed or altitude 
could involve threats to safety and security, and states have a right to defend and protect their national 
integrity by any appropriate means available to them, “from the seizure of the crew . . . to reprisals of 
all kinds.”). 
42. Jijo George Cherian & Job Abraham, Concept of Private Property in Space—An Analysis, 2 J. 
INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 211, 212 (2007). 
43. Chester Ward, Projecting the Law of the Sea into the Law of Space, 1957 JAG J. 3, 3 (1957) (“Are 
the uses of space going to be primarily of military value—or will they be primarily of commercial 
benefit?”). 
44. Cherian & Abraham, supra note 42, at 212. 
45. Years earlier, Arthur C. Clarke cautioned that “there must be an upper limit to national 
sovereignty because otherwise ‘in the course of a day, [on a rotating globe] every country will lay claim 
to a large portion of the Universe!’”  Doyle, supra note 37, at 1, 5–6 (alterations in original). 
46. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5. 
47. See id. at pmbl. (“Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific 
as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes[.]”). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at art. II. 
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denouncing any means of acquiring property in outer space, COPUOS 
granted freedom for unabated, albeit peaceful, use of shared resources.  
However, this allowance failed to consider the unique characteristics of 
space.50  While outer space is theoretically infinite, in contrast, objects in 
geospace congregate within a confined region specifically due to orbital 
mechanics. 
Further, the OST severely lacks language addressing sustainability and any 
flexibility for future technological developments.51  As spacefaring 
capabilities advanced, the Corpus Juris Spatialis increased with four additional 
treaties between 1968 and 1979 that governed liability for accidents,52 duties 
to assist in the rescue and return of persons and spacecraft,53 registration 
obligations,54 and a notably unsuccessful framework for resource recovery 
on the Moon.55  Each successive document echoed the object and purpose 
 
50. COPUOS, Fifty-Fourth, supra note 7, at 12.  It seems as though COPUOS relied on the 
magnitude of space as a fail-safe for resource management. 
51. COPUOS also failed to consider the positive utility of nuclear power as a fuel source, rather 
than just a trump card for military engagement.  See Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50. Can 
it Survive a New Space Race?, 103 A.B.A. J. 45, 46 (2017) (“The treaty . . . is a product of the Cold War 
and primarily addresses concerns of that era, including nuclear war.  So for 50 years, the treaty has 
prevented belligerent nations from putting weapons of mass destruction into space.”).  Considering 
the insurmountable distance between celestial destinations from Earth, nuclear technology comprises 
the bulk of current research and development efforts, ironically adverse to the original purposes behind 
the OST.  Compare John Wenz, NASA Targets Next-Gen Nuclear Reactors for Spacecraft, Space Colonies, 
ASTRONOMY.COM (Sept. 17, 2018), http://www.astronomy.com/news/2018/09/next-gen-nuclear-
reactors-may-power-nasa-spacecraft-and-space-colonies [https://perma.cc/SAP4-T435] (“I don’t 
think we can expand into deep space without nuclear power[.] . . .’ says David Poston, who leads the 
Kilopower team.”), with Krause, supra note 51, 46 (quoting then-U.S.-Representative-now-NASA 
Administrator, Jim Bridenstine, “[f]ifty years ago . . . our main concern was nuclear proliferation”). 
52. See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 
1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention] (expanding on article VII of 
the OST by addressing liability for space activity which could potentially damage the surface of Earth 
and other objects in space). 
53. See Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (responding to 
the need to further develop duties of nations to provide assistance to space activity participants). 
54. See Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 24, 1975, 
28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (implementing duties to register all objects launched into space to 
foster situational awareness). 
55. See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
pmbl., art. 4, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (reiterating the object and purpose of the OST, but 
providing a potential mechanism for surface and subsurface use of celestial bodies).  Largely rejected, 
the Moon Treaty does not boast international support because it endorses the appropriation of 
resources under a tenuous benefit-sharing regime.  COPUOS, Fifty-Seventh, supra note 17 at 10.  An 
amendment to the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) similarly implements a benefit-sharing 
mechanism for resources recovered in international waters but remains unratified by the United States 
11
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of the OST and refrained from establishing a separate regime for geospace 
specifically. 
III.    A TRAGEDY OF THE GEOSPACE COMMONS 
The common heritage of mankind anchors the governance of global 
commons.56  While some scholars have yet to accept such verbiage as 
international custom,57 others submit it as establishing an emerging 
principle of jus cogens.58  Proponents suggest that because “mankind” 
replaces the typical language of “all States,” then any mention of “mankind” 
insists humanity must be able to enjoy the collective benefits of resources 
within a global commons.59  As a result, mankind itself has become the 
 
Senate.  The Senate’s reluctance lies in national security concerns and the potential to create unwanted 
precedent for resource recovery operations in space.  Kristina Wong, Rumsfeld Still Opposes Law of Sea 
Treaty, WASH. POST (June 14, 2012), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/14/ 
rumsfeld-hits-law-of-sea-treaty/ [https://perma.cc/RN5D-KQ6S]. 
56. The principle clearly exists within the text of UNCLOS and the OST.  Outer Space Treaty, 
supra note 5, at pmbl.; UNCLOS, supra note 36, at pt. XI § 2 art. 136.  While the ATS has traces of the 
principle it is not entirely clear whether Antarctica’s global commons falls within the scope of the 
common heritage of mankind.  But when compared to the five generally accepted principles mentioned 
in this section, it seems more likely than not that Antarctica is subject to the common heritage of 
mankind due to the provisions concerning benefit-sharing, non-appropriation, nonproliferation, and 
the subsequent sustainability protections afforded by the Madrid Protocol.  But see generally Jeffrey Loan, 
The Common Heritage of Mankind in Antarctica: An Analysis in Light of the Threats Posed by Climate Change, 
1 N.Z.Y.B. INT’L L. 149 (2004) (pointing to the existence of the common heritage of mankind 
principles in the ATS but arguing against any definitive proof). 
57. See Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 
35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 190, 199 (1986) (“The [Common Heritage of Mankind] must remain only a 
conceptual ideal, not an international legal reality supported by State practice.”). 
58. See Tare C. Brisibe, Customary International Law, Arms Control and the Environment in Outer Space, 
8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 375, 389 (2009) (“It is even possible to go further in this direction and affirm 
that the fundamental principles of [the OST] have become preemptory norms of general international 
law/jus cogens accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole.”); Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 43 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 312, 316–17 
(1983), http://www.zaoerv.de/43_1983/43_1983_2_a_312_337.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRJ6-CJVT] 
(discussing the common heritage of mankind principle in relation to UNCLOS, equating the Sea-Bed 
Authority to a representative of mankind).  It seems illogical to deny jus cogens status to any global 
commons as the common heritage of mankind, particularly when the treaty bodies governing such 
commons boast extensive ratification or signature.  Contra Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The 
Common Heritage of Mankind Principle vs. The First in Time, First in Right, Rule of Property, 69 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 689, 706 (2004) (concluding the improbability of the validity of the common heritage of mankind 
principle due to the polarized interests of developed and developing nations).  Despite the cleavages 
that exist between developing and developed nations, geospace provides benefits to all of mankind, 
whether directly or indirectly. 
59. As Rüdiger Wolfrum explains: 
12
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“one to dispose of . . . resources,” and upon invoking the interest of 
mankind “the interests of future generations have to be respected in making 
use of [resources].”60  One can analogize this position to property principles 
against waste in the context of a present interest holder’s duty to vested 
future interests.61  In summarizing the five shared conceptions of the 
common heritage of mankind principle, Dr. Shackleford provides support 
to this construction: 
First, there can be no private or public appropriation of the commons.  
Second, representatives from all nations must manage resources since a 
commons area is considered to belong to everyone.  Third, all nations must 
actively share in the benefits acquired from exploitation of the resources from 
the common heritage region.  Fourth, there can be no weaponry or military 
installations established in commons areas.  Fifth, the commons should be 
preserved for the benefit of future generations.62 
Logically following, the OST’s presentment of outer space as the common 
heritage of mankind grants an implied property right to all persons in the 
geospace commons.  Applying Dr. Shackleford’s principles, the credible 
 
This term provokes several questions: Does this constitute a new subject of international law?  
Would it be possible to argue that the interests of mankind have to be distinguished from the 
interests of all States?  Or does the term ‘mankind’ indicate that the interests of those parts of 
mankind have to be taken into account which are not represented by the very States?  The 
documents available are silent on these questions with one exception.  The Convention on the 
Law of the Sea mentions [mankind] as potential beneficiaries of the utilization of the sea—and 
this should be regarded as a logical conclusion to be drawn from the term ‘mankind’—also 
peoples who have not attained full independence or other self-governing status. 
Wolfrum, supra note 58, at 318. 
60. See id. at 317–18 (referring to the joining of “mankind” and “heritage” language in the OST). 
61. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 13, topic 2 § 204(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1936) 
(“[Owner of present interest] shall not intentionally inflict harm upon the owner of such future 
interest[.]”); see Wolfrum, supra note 58, at 318–19 (arguing the utilization of resources within a global 
commons requires recovery activities to limit undue waste of resources and a mechanism for protecting 
the environment). 
62. Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 111 (citations omitted); see also 
Jennifer Frakes, Notes and Comments: The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer 
Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409, 
412–13 (2003) (cataloguing the common five elements of the common heritage principle represented 
in non-appropriation, common management, benefit sharing, peaceful purposes, and preservation for 
future generations). 
13
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treaties63 operate in tandem with the non-appropriation, nonproliferation, 
and equitable benefit-sharing elements of the common heritage principle.  
Permanently enjoining claims of sovereignty thus prohibits the 
establishment of exclusive economic rights and reinforces equitable 
benefit-sharing.64  However, the lack of resource management and 
preservation language disallows mankind a mechanism to protect its interest 
in the geospace commons if its usage results in damage, waste, or 
destruction of its resources.65 
A. Orbital Utility 
In the context of orbital real estate, spacefaring entities formulate satellite 
acquisition strategies for either low earth orbit (LEO) or geosynchronous 
orbit (GSO).66  While each particular orbit can accommodate most space 




63. With less than 20 parties to the treaty, the Moon Treaty is considered a categorical failure.  
Cf. Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at  158 (“It remains legally unclear whether 
such activity [under the Moon Treaty] is allowed under established space law.”). 
64. The exclusive economic zones under the UNCLOS regime is a key point of contention for 
the United States. 
65. Within the context of law and economics, if a property interest is efficiently assigned it will 
afford the interest holder a procedure for protecting those interests, either through payment of 
damages, granting an injunction, or special negotiation.  See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. 
L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960) (examining the effect of the delimitation of property rights on the ability to 
negotiate). 
66. For brevity, this Comment will focus on these two broad orbits, though other orbits exist, 
such as highly eccentric orbit, medium earth orbit, escape orbit, and various subtypes.  ESA’s Annual 
Space Environment Report, EUR. SPACE AGENCY 5 (May 18, 2018) [hereinafter ESA’s Annual Report], 
https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T2B9-GM6N].  Geosynchronous and geostationary are used interchangeably, but 
for the purposes of this Comment, the geosynchronous nomenclature will suffice.  Both orbital 
horizons allow a satellite to remain above a fixed point; geostationary orbits merely lie on the same 
plane as the equator.  See Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and the 
International Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1101 n.30 (2000) (“The 
determination of whether a satellite is geostationary or geosynchronous is one of degree rather than of 
strict definition.”); Remote Sensing: Geosynchronous vs Geostationary Orbits, GISGEOGRAPHY (Feb. 23, 
2018), https://gisgeography.com/geosynchronous-geostationary-orbits/ [https://perma.cc/2LQH-
U2NF].  Regardless of the terminology, sources referring to the geostationary orbit subtype equally 
support arguments regarding geosynchronous orbit resource use. 
67. For instance, large structures such as the late-Mir Space Station and the International Space 
Station (ISS) can only feasibly reside in low earth orbit (LEO).  Elizabeth Howell, Mir Space Station: 
Testing Long-Term Stays in Space, SPACE.COM (Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.space.com/19650-mir-space-
station.html [https://perma.cc/46RZ-QBMX]. 
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distinct orbital mechanics appurtenant to each orbit.68 
1. Low Earth Orbit 
Objects in LEO orbit between 100 to 1,200 miles above Earth’s 
surface.69  Because it is so “close,” LEO acquisition provides spacefarers a 
lower cost option as launches require relatively low energy budgets to 
achieve proper positioning.70  However, unlike GSO, LEO satellites are not 
fixed above a targeted location, which necessitates the placement of multiple 
satellites at various inclinations if a telecommunications operator intends to 
provide uninterrupted service to its subscribers.71  In the past five years, 
LEO has become riddled with massive satellite constellations, further 
compounding the negative utility of LEO.72  To the dismay of the 
International Space Station’s (ISS) residents, every piece of jettisoned launch 
vehicle debris—whether rocket bodies, mission-related objects, or paint 
 
68. Three Classes of Orbit, NAT’L AERONAUTICAL & SPACE ADMIN. (Sept. 4, 2009), 
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/OrbitsCatalog/page2.php [https://perma.cc/7RV5-LB 
7G]. 
69. Matt Williams, What is Low Earth Orbit?, UNIVERSE TODAY (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.universetoday.com/85322/what-is-low-earth-orbit/ [https://perma.cc/VH5M-22BF]. 
70. The advent of “CubeSats” has also increased coverage capabilities and lowered the cost of 
satellite manufacturing, making LEO an attractive option for satellite internet services.  Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking and Order on Reconsideration, In re Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New 
Space Age, IB Docket No. 18-313, 33 FCC Rcd. 11352, 11353 (Nov. 19, 2018).  Because of the 
relatively short travel distance and fuel requirements, construction and habitation of the ISS makes 
LEO the most economically feasible orbital location.  Robert Frost, Why the International Space Station 
Stay So Close to Earth, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2015, 12:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
quora/2015/12/09/why-the-international-space-station-stays-so-close-to-earth/#2d73a518477d 
[https://perma.cc/5LXL-3P4M]. 
71. Telecommunications & Integrated Applications: Orbits, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, 
http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Telecommunications_Integrated_Applications/Orbits% 
20 [https://perma.cc/Q4C5-XGJE]. 
72. See generally Application for Authority to Launch and Operate a Non-Geostationary Satellite 
Orbit System in Ka-Band Frequencies, IBFS File No. SAT-LOA-20190704-00057, Call Sign S3051 
(July 4, 2019) (requesting authority to launch Amazon’s Kuiper System consisting of 3,236 satellites in 
LEO); Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authorization, In re Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, 
33 FCC Rcd. 11434 (Nov. 15, 2018) (addressing SpaceX’s proposal to add 7,518 more satellites to its 
previously authorized constellation of 4,425 satellites); Order and Declaratory Ruling, In re WorldVu 
Satellites Ltd., 32 FCC Rcd. 5366 (June 23, 2017) (approving OneWeb’s request for 720-satellite 
constellation in LEO); see also Application for Modification, In re WorldVu Satellites Ltd., IBFS File 
No. SAT-MOD-20180319-00022 (Mar. 19, 2018) (proposing increase of OneWeb’s satellite 
constellation to 1,900 satellites). 
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flecks73—resides in LEO.74  While most of these objects eventually find 
their way into various decay or graveyard orbits, the transient status of debris 
still poses a substantial threat to functional satellites and human lives.75 
2. Geosynchronous Orbit 
To contrast, reaching GSO requires an increased energy budget,76 but 
once attained, the orbital mechanics of GSO allows space objects to remain 
stationary above one location throughout the object’s entire orbital transit, 
with minimal requirements to adjust for perturbances caused by Earth’s 
gravity.77  This stationary attribute creates incredible demand on GSO 
acquisition services because, unlike LEO, only one satellite is necessary for 
the same transmission services in GSO.  But unlike LEO, the physics of 
radio frequency allocation places spatial restrictions on the permissible 
number of GSO satellites.  Additionally, due to the distance between GSO 
satellites and radio transmitters on Earth, only three suitable radio 
frequencies exist.78  While these limitations prevent harmful radio 
 
73. ESA’s Annual Report, supra note 66, at 3–4. 
74. See SCOTT KELLY, ENDURANCE: MY YEAR IN SPACE, A LIFETIME OF DISCOVERY 397–
405 (2017) (recalling the notification of a “red late-notice conjunction” on the ISS, which signifies that 
tracking devices missed an approaching piece of space debris but the temporal proximity renders 
avoidance maneuvers an unavailable option); see also COPUOS, Fifty-Fourth, supra note 7, at 9 
(“Moreover, by following the number of collisions recorded by the [ISS], and the number of times the 
ISS has had to manoeuvre to avoid debris, one can see the true impact of these objects on space 
operations.”). 
75. Rubicon Global, Space Waste & Debris: The Biggest Problem We Can’t See?, RUBICON (Jan. 9, 
2018) [hereinafter Space & Waste Debris], https://www.rubiconglobal.com/blog-space-waste-debris/ 
[https://perma.cc/W7DZ-33RX]; see also Matthew Shouppe, The IRAS/GGSE 4 Close Approach, 
MEDIUM (Jan. 31, 2020), https://medium.com/@leolabs_space/the-iras-ggse-4-close-approach-
a99de19c1ed9 [https://perma.cc/9WP2-2YHD] (describing an incident on January 27th, 2020 when 
two non-functioning satellites came within 18 meters of each other, at relative velocities of 32,900 miles 
per hour). 
76. See Rae Paoletta, Why SpaceX Won’t Be Landing Its Rocket Today, GIZMODO (May 16, 2017, 
9:00 AM), https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2017/05/why-spacex-wont-be-landing-its-rocket-today/ 
[https://perma.cc/EJM8-DLJD] (“[B]ecause the payload is so heavy and geostationary orbit is at a 
much higher altitude [than LEO], SpaceX has to use pretty much all its fuel to get its satellite in the 
right spot.”). 
77. Three Classes of Orbit, supra note 68.  These adjustments are known as “stationkeeping.”  E.g., 
T. S. Kelso, Basics of the Geostationary Orbit, SATELLITE TIMES (May 1998), http://www.celestrak.com/ 
columns/v04n07/ [https://perma.cc/3A25-7TXH]. 
78. See Roberts, supra note 66, at 1104 (describing the usage and limitations of C band, Ku band, 
and Ka band frequencies); Telecommunications & Integrated Applications: Satellite Frequency Bands, EUR. 
SPACE AGENCY (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Telecommunications_Integra 
ted_Applications/Satellite_frequency_bands [https://perma.cc/J7K8-CQ9F] (identifying the 
different frequency designations and their respective uses). 
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interference, it inflates the scarcity of GSO slot availability.79  As a result, 
GSO is the highest valued orbit available.80 
B. Kessler Syndrome—Fueling the Tragedy 
Today, over eighty sovereign actors and private organizations participate 
in space activity.81  The OST’s Cold-War-inspired objectives failed to make 
substantial allowances for future development, despite the cautions of such 
short-sighted construction.82  Over-utilization evaded the immediate 
concern of signatory nations because the then-current technology did not 
lend itself to significant exploitation of analogous commons, such as the 
oceans and Antarctica.83  Considering the dimensions of contemporary real 
 
79. Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Const. art. 1(2)(a), adopted by Plenipotentiary Conference 
(Minneapolis, 1998); see Roberts, supra note 66, at 1101 (“A variety of factors hinder the continued use 
of the geostationary orbit. In particular, the medium is restricted by (1) the physical nature of the 
geostationary orbit, (2) the industry’s technological capabilities, (3) the realities of the 
telecommunication marketplace, and (4) regulatory limitations imposed by the international 
community.”).  Essentially, if an entity wants to acquire stationary positioning over the United States, 
it must compete with similarly motivated entities.  See Paul R. Portney & Molly K. Macauley, Slicing the 
Geostationary Pie: Property Rights in Orbit, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (July 26, 1984), 
http://www.aei.org/publication/slicing-the-geostationary-pie-property-rights-in-orbit/ [https:// 
perma.cc/EN74-MEXW] (“Once it has decided on slot-widths, how then does the FCC choose among 
commercial applicants for these valuable pieces of galactic real estate? How does it decide between an 
application for expanded service from a well-established satellite company and one for unique services 
from an entrepreneurial newcomer? . . . [T]hrough an administrative process known as ‘allocation 
under a public interest standard.’”). 
80. Roberts, supra note 66, at 1101. 
81. This activity includes operating meteorological, telecommunication, and global positioning 
system (GPS) satellites, as well as activity on the ISS.  See generally Online Index of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space, supra note 8 (indexing known objects currently in space attributable to certain states or 
organizations).  Commercial participation is expected to grow substantially due to NASA’s plans to 
privatize LEO and the ISS for purposes other than scientific research.  NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE 
ADMIN., NASA PLAN FOR COMMERCIAL LEO DEVELOPMENT TO ACHIEVE A ROBUST LOW-EARTH 
ORBIT ECONOMY FROM WHICH NASA CAN PURCHASE SERVICES AS ONE OF MANY CUSTOMERS 5 
(June 2019), https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/commleodevt_plan_6-7-19_final 
-links-new.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7NU-NN59]. 
82. See Ward, supra note 44, at 3 (“Today neither lawyers nor governments are prepared to state 
the legal flight rules applicable to presently operating rockets and planned satellites.  For the second 
time in the present century science and engineering have far out-stripped the law.” (quoting John Cobb 
Cooper, Address before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 26, 1956))). 
83. Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 120–21 (“[UNCLOS, ATS, and 
the OST] were created during the Cold War at a time before technological progress fully opened up 
these areas to economic activity.”).  However, protocols and amendments subsequently shored up the 
deficiencies in the ATS and UNCLOS text.  Currently, all mining efforts are suspended in Antarctica 
until 2048 unless a binding agreement to that effect enters into force.  Madrid Protocol, supra note 18, 
at arts. 7, 25(5).  When technology outgrew the original provisions of UNCLOS, nation-states sought 
17
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property, one can visualize the boundaries and confines of a tract of land.84  
Even in the context of more abstract property interests, such as minerals or 
the sea, one can envisage the inherent spatial limitations.85  Contrary to 
Earth-side property, legal scholars proffer that space lacks tangible 
parameters.86  This mischaracterization marks the point of departure 
between the current sustainability of geospace and this Comment’s 
proposed construct.87 
The laws of astrophysics physically limit our ability to occupy geospace.  
And because it is finite, every satellite launched into space adds a 
corresponding negative utility to geospace.88  In 2019 alone,89 the potential 
for an interruption capable of derailing any derivative benefit from space 
drew ever closer—the essence of the tragedy of the commons.90  Without 
a binding mitigation framework, continued satellite proliferation will only 
catalyze the destruction of our correlative rights91 in the geospace 
commons. 
 
to recover mineral resources outside of their territorial waters, necessitating the creation of the 
International Seabed Authority, which facilitates the operation of deep-sea mining enterprises.  G.A. 
Res. 48/263, annex, Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (Aug. 17, 1994).  The following year, binding 
conservation measures for vulnerable fish stocks became available for signature.  Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, T.I.A.S. No. 01-1211.  We are overdue for an update to 
the Corpus Juris Spatialis. 
84. For example, metes and bounds signify the finite extent of use and dominion over a set 
acreage. 
85. See Jordan Hanania, Kailyn Stenhouse & Jason Donev, Energy Education: Oil and Gas Traps, 
UNIV. CALGARY, https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Oil_and_gas_traps [https://perma.cc/
NP4H-257W] (illustrating varieties of stratification where oil and gas deposits form, indicative of 
physical confinement and an exhaustible nature of the resource). 
86. See Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 141 (“What makes space 
unique, however, is its status as the ultimate international commons, replete with infinite resources 
sufficient to satisfy infinite demand.”). 
87. Button, supra note 3, at 539–40. 
88. Hardin, supra note 6, at 1244–45. 
89. See Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space, supra note 8 (indicating 581 satellites were 
added in geospace in 2019). 
90. Hardin, supra note 6, at 1244–45. 
91. Similar to the development of oil and gas law, space jurisprudence is sui generis, or “of its 
own kind.”  Sui generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Wm. E. Colby, The Law of Oil and 
Gas: A Consideration of Landowners’ Rights, Particularly as Developed in California, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 357, 357 
(1943).  Parallel to oil and gas law’s use of ferae naturae in developing correlative rights, analogizing the 
construct of correlative rights to the global commons in orbital space is an appealing corollary.  See 
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 581–82 (Tex. 1948) (rejecting the wild-animal analogy but 
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The 2017 Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS made a 
chilling summary of the reality of the space debris threat when it explained:  
More than 20,000 pieces of space debris the size of a tennis ball or larger orbit 
the Earth with a velocity of nearly 17,500 mph.  These uncontrolled fragments 
and other debris (such as discarded rocket bodies, and retired satellites) can 
collide with each other and generate more debris, in a cycle popularly known 
as the “Kessler syndrome.”  The Kessler syndrome in turn results in an 
exponential growth of orbital debris as time progresses, with an 
ever-increasing risk for operational bodies in orbit.  In addition to their 
number, these pieces of debris have enough energy to break the rigid wall of 
satellites, and destroy satellites.92 
Donald J. Kessler cautioned that we would eventually reach a tipping point, 
triggering a chain reaction in near-Earth orbit of hypervelocity collisions93 
that will trap humanity on Earth.94  Prospectively, because the “delay in 
implementation of [debris mitigation] methods reduces their 
effectiveness,”95 without comprehensive compliance, once Kessler 
Syndrome begins, the result will likely revert our telecommunication abilities 
back to the late 1800s.  Yet self-interested parties continue to exploit highly 
sought-after orbital resources.96 
 
respecting its precursory benefit in developing the rule of capture and correlative rights).  Though 
correlative rights relate to interests in a mineral tract common to contiguous landowners, one could 
analogize this construction to the common heritage of mankind to justify granting an equitable 
opportunity to benefit from a common space resource.  See Wolfrum, supra note 58, at 318 (“The 
adoption of the term ‘mankind’ from the Outer Space Treaty taken together with the term ‘heritage’ at 
least indicates that the interests of future generations have to be respected in making use of the 
sea-bed.”). 
92. COPUOS, Fifty-Fourth, supra note 7, at 9.  These figures only represent the fragments 
under direct observation from debris tracking devices.  It is estimated that over 166 million pieces of 
debris—ranging in size from 1 millimeter to 1 centimeter—reside in geospace, and regardless of size, 
these tiny materials have the potential to vaporize objects upon collision.  Space Debris by the Numbers, 
EUR. SPACE AGENCY, (Jan. 2018) https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_ 
Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers [https://perma.cc/2J9M-WUBJ]; Donald J. Kessler & Burton 
G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. GEOPHYSICAL 
RES. 2637, 2639 (1978). 
93. Kessler & Cour-Palais, supra note 92, at 2639–40. 
94. Kurzgesagt–In a Nutshell, End of Space—Creating a Prison for Humanity, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yS1ibDImAYU (last visited May 11, 2020). 
95. Kessler & Cour-Palais, supra note 92, at 2645. 
96. See Portney & Macauley, supra note 79 (discussing entities competing desires for a “slice” of 
the “geostationary pie”). 
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C. Domestic Legislation 
One of the primary challenges jurists face when formulating international 
standards for space activity lies with COPUOS, because the unanimous 
support of its delegates is a prerequisite for concluding any multilateral 
agreement.97  While the consensus method initially provided a great deal of 
strength to the Corpus Juris Spatialis’s mandates, the Committee’s 
ever-expanding membership has frustrated the adoption of any binding 
principles and guidelines since the 1980s.98  Despite the dearth of 
compulsory language, non-binding declarations of law inform us of the 
likely trajectory toward binding agreements in the future.  Even without 
mandatory language, domestic legislation has mirrored COPUOS’s 
instruments addressing mitigation efforts.99 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), and Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) serve key administrative functions in the mitigation of debris 
attributable to U.S. space activity.  Prior to the passage of the Spurring 
Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015 
(SPACE Act),100 NASA facilitated many of humanity’s first triumphs in 
space faring and still plays an active role in tracking, cataloging, and 
formulating debris mitigation standards in the U.S.101  The 2019 update to 
these standards reflected the culmination of debris research, and sets 
benchmarks on permissible debris creation.102  While NASA has long been 
 
97. Eilene Galloway, Consensus Decisionmaking by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, 7 J. SPACE L. 3, 3 (1979). 
98. GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY 32 (Ram S. Jakhu & Joseph 
N. Pelton eds., 2017); see generally INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS 
(U.N. Office of Outer Space Affairs, 2017) (compiling documents adopted by General Assembly since 
1967). 
99. Though this Comment focuses on U.S. law specifically, other nation–states have corollary 
statutory schemes.  For a more comprehensive review of other nation-states’ domestic legislation, see 
COMPENDIUM: SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION, supra note 21. 
100. Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, Pub. 
L. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (codified in scattered sections of 51 U.S.C.). 
101. NASA ACAD. OF PROGRAM/PROJECT & ENG’G LEADERSHIP, ORBITAL DEBRIS 
MANAGEMENT & RISK MITIGATION §§ 2–3 (Daniel Connell et al. eds., 2012). 
102. U.S. OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES 
(2019).  The Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) consist of five objectives which 
seek to (1) control debris release, (2) minimize the creation of new debris from accidents, (3) increase 
capacities for better spacecraft design, (4) dictate methods for post-mission disposal of defunct 
spacecraft, and (5) establish probability benchmarks for special mission—such as satellite 
constellations—disposal plans.  Id. 
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one of the three major space agencies operating in space, the reality of 
political cycles has forced NASA to look elsewhere to sustain project 
funding and support of existing national laboratories, namely the ISS.103  
Still, much of the commercial activity in space consists of NASA-awarded 
government contracts for resupply missions, payload transport, and other 
collaborative projects with other nations.104  However, in the last decade, 
independent commercial activity has exploded.  The SPACE Act thus 
initiated the privatization of space, as commercial payloads are now being 
launched into geospace unilaterally without any precursory relationship with 
NASA, other than the occasional use of NASA launch facilities.105 
 In order to access space and place a satellite into orbit, a launching party 
must obtain a launch license from the FAA,106 and an authorization for 
 
103. Due to the cancellation of the Space Shuttle Program: 
Between 2006 and 2018, NASA will pay Roscosmos approximately $3.4 billion to ferry 64 NASA 
and partner astronauts to and from the ISS in its Soyuz spacecraft at prices ranging from 
approximately $21.3 million to $81.9 million for each roundtrip. 
 The goal of the Commercial Crew Program is to foster an industry that would meet the 
Agency’s needs as well as those of other Government and nongovernmental entities.  As of May 
2016, NASA had spent approximately $3.4 billion on this effort.  The final phase of this effort 
began in September 2014 when NASA awarded the Space Exploration Technologies Corporation 
(SpaceX) and The Boeing Company (Boeing) firm-fixed-price contracts to complete development 
of their crew transportation systems and, assuming they meet the Agency’s safety and 
performance requirements, receive certification to begin flying astronauts to the ISS on a regular 
basis. 
NASA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., IG-16-028 (A-15-010-00), NASA’S COMMERCIAL CREW 
PROGRAM: UPDATE ON DEVELOPMENT AND CERTIFICATION EFFORTS 1 (2016). 
104. For instance, all human transport to and from the ISS is on the Russian Soyuz which 
launches from and re-enters the atmosphere near the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.  Id.  This, 
in and of itself, is powerful evidence of the global interest in routine access to space, considering the 
tenuous political relationship between the United States, Europe, and Russia. 
105. SpaceX uses NASA’s 39A launch complex, but often lands its reusable rocket bodies on 
two seaward barges—Of Course I Still Love You and Just Read the Instructions.  It has also 
constructed a private launch facility at Boca Chica Beach near the U.S.–Mexico border.  About SpaceX, 
SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/about [https://perma.cc/R3HJ-AQ8N].  BlueOrigin has 
constructed a launch facility near Van Horn, Texas and VirginGalactic has signed a twenty-year lease 
to provide private space flights from Spaceport America in Truth or Consequences, New Mexico.  
FAA OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSP., ANNUAL COMPENDIUM OF COMMERCIAL SPACE 
TRANSPORTATION 29–30 (2017). 
106. 14 C.F.R. § 413.3 (2019).  As a prerequisite to licensure, the FAA reviews launch 
applications for safety, potential environmental impact, liability exposure, and airspace integration of 
the proposed launch and eventual orbital position.  Id. pt. 415 app. B.  Notably, the FAA requires a 
debris analysis be submitted with license application materials, and licensees must ensure that any 
debris jettisoned from any payload not come within 200 feet of another manned or mannable space object 
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satellite radio frequency transmission from the FCC.107  Because 
commercial space contractors have created business models that operate to 
the exclusion of government contracts, this upsurge of private activity 
affords the FCC a substantial level of influence over the future of geospace.  
Aware of its normative power, the FCC proposed a rulemaking for updated 
debris mitigation standards as part of its licensure reviews.108  But as part 
of the current administration’s policies toward economic growth and 
competition, the FCC’s efforts to create these new standards have been 
“paused.”109  Without NASA oversight and the FCC’s final rule for 
mitigation standards, COPUOS has become the only feasible avenue for 
promulgating a framework that considers economic incentives in tandem 
with intergenerational equity.  Under Hardin’s analysis, coercive regulation 
and management of the commons provide a workable solution to free us 
from our current trajectory.110 
  
 
during launch.  Id. §§ 417.211; 417.107(e).  As such, the FAA is specifically concerned with the safety 
of humans rather than the lasting utility of geospace. 
107. 47 C.F.R. § 25.115 (2019).  The FCC is the domestic counterpart to the ITU and is 
“responsible for managing and licensing the electromagnetic spectrum for commercial users” seeking 
satellite acquisition services.  Licensing, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/licensing-databases/licensing 
[https://perma.cc/HL6B-9VSP]; see supra text accompanying note 19 (discussing the role of the ITU).  
An application is reviewed concurrently by both the FCC and ITU to coordinate allocation of the radio 
frequency spectrum.  See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 25.146(c) (requiring a satellite operator to obtain a finding 
from the ITU that proposed frequency exposure limits are “favorable” prior to a satellite operator’s 
utilization of assigned frequency in LEO). 
108. Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, 84 Fed. Reg. 4,742 (proposed Feb. 19, 
2019). 
109. Daniel Wilson, Commerce Asks FCC to Pause Space Junk Mitigation Rule, LAW360 (7:57 PM, 
Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1148129/commerce-asks-fcc-to-pause-space-junk-
mitigation-rule [https://perma.cc/5W5T-EMQM].  Rather, the recent Space Policy Directive created 
the Office of Space Commerce under the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the FCC has become 
but a meager cog in the interagency wheel.  The Space Policy Directive intends to consolidate the 
launch and reentry process into the Department of Commerce, rather than across the FCC, the Federal 
Aviation Administration, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.  Space Policy 
Directive–2, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,901, 24,901 (May 24, 2018). 
110. Hardin restates Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s maxim, “Freedom is the recognition of 
necessity” to emphasize that assigning rights, such as property rights, forces society to abandon 
flooding the commons without restraint, yet results in freedom from a self-inflicted demise.  See Hardin, 
supra note 6, at 1247–48 (illustrating the success of abandoning unabated commons usage by restricting 
waste disposal that would otherwise have led to condemning an entire commons); Shackelford, Tragedy 
of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 130 (“[O]nce occupation of a territory is possible, [regulations] 
become necessary to catalyze development.”). 
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IV.    NECESSITY FOR REGULATION TO PRESERVE THE HERITAGE 
OF MANKIND—A PROPOSAL 
Conceptually, all persons hold an implied property right in the space 
commons.111  As such, spacefaring entities and developing nations possess 
an equitable right to access and use orbital resources.112  But the sui generis 
nature of geospace presents a paradox requiring a unique regime for the 
sustainable usage of its resources.113  The international community cannot 
realize the advantages of the common heritage principle under a property 
regime because any conceivable assignment would violate the 
non-appropriation clause or unjustly enrich a particular interest.114  This 
 
111. Accord Shackelford, Tragedy of the Common Heritage, supra note 6, at 110 (“[T]heoretically, all 
of humanity became the sovereign over the international commons.”). 
112. Cf. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pt. 1, art. 1, Jan. 1, 
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (“1. All people have the right of self-determination. . . .  2. All people may, for 
their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations 
arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law.”).  Even though the United States has yet to ratify the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), its signature obligates it not to act in such a way that 
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra 
note 16, at art. 18. 
113. Aside from the limitations of LEO and GSO, it seems prudent to mention that satellites 
can only maintain their orbital positions through small orbital maneuvers.  Unlike conventional 
airplanes which change altitude and speed without losing any degree of control, satellites cannot freely 
move about the thermosphere or exosphere without compromising the utility of their permissible slots 
or endangering the operation of neighboring objects.  Alicia Ault, Ask Smithsonian: How Does a Satellite 
Stay Up?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-
institution/ask-smithsonian-how-does-satellite-stay-180954165/ [https://perma.cc/EP8W-AZNL] 
(describing how satellites stay in orbit by counteracting the downward pull of Earth’s gravity with 
forward momentum); cf. Roberts, supra note 66, at 1101 (“[F]or the purposes of most policy 
discussions, the geostationary orbit can be considered a one-dimensional line describing a great circle 
around the planet.”).  Any excessive propulsion in the wrong direction could cause radio interference, 
loss of a particular orbit, or an uncontrolled satellite.  See generally Craig E. Roberts, The SOHO Mission 
L1 Halo Orbit Recovery From the Attitude Control Anomalies of 1998, Proceedings of the Libration Point 
Orbits and Applications Conference (Spain, 2002) (detailing the difficulty of maintaining halo orbits 
and the potential adversities of over-propulsed satellites).  Fundamentally, using geospace requires 
spacefaring entities to occupy the resource for an extended period of time to realize any benefit from 
their capital investment.  See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 192 
(2014) (“[ITU] continues to consider limiting the duration of assignments, while recognizing the 
importance of ensuring an adequate period of time for owners to amortize the investments that are 
required to launch and operate satellites.”). 
114. Some proposals unnecessarily burden the entities capable of reaching space with capital 
investment but require a distribution of benefits to states that did not make a contribution to the 
endeavor.  Landry, supra note 6, at 540–42.  Similarly inequitable proposals suggest property auctions, 
awarding space realty based on a “monstrous” bureaucratic valuation mechanism.  Id. at 558–560.  
Another allocates property proportionate to a state’s Earth-side landmass.  Id. at 546–50.  Property 
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means that only regulatory solutions can protect the interests inherent in a 
commons protected for the common heritage of mankind. 
A. The Motivations for International Compliance 
The crux of a workable treaty lies in the consent of the parties to the 
agreement.115  Thereafter, signatories internalize the agreement’s object and 
purpose into their domestic law, or in the case of international 
organizations, into an institutional framework.116  To implement a binding 
international instrument, we must therefore ask the question: Why do 
nations follow international law,117 and how can we use those behavioral 
realities to construct a workable framework to ensure geospace survives?118 
 
regimes provide legal clarity and allow property owners a means to protect their interests through 
damages, nuisance, or conversion claims.  Definitive property rights force the internalization of 
negative externalities, an ideal enforcement measure for space jurisprudence.  See Harold Demsetz, 
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. R. 347, 348 (1967) (“A primary function of property 
rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”).  The ITU’s 
allocation of orbital slots technically evades violation of the non-appropriation clause because it 
provides a means for merely using orbital real estate, even though permissible use resembles that of a 
leasehold.  Accord Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Const. art. 44(2), adopted by Plenipotentiary Conference 
(Minneapolis, 1998) (“In using frequency bands for radio services, Member States shall bear in mind 
that radio frequencies and any associated orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit, are limited 
natural resources and that they must be used rationally, efficiently, and economically . . . so that 
countries or groups of countries may have equitable access to those orbits and frequencies, taking into 
account the special needs of the developing countries.”) (emphasis added).  Regardless of this 
quasi-property right, the OST and Liability Convention do not adequately force the internalization of 
externalities.  One’s liability for damages is only invoked if sufficient evidence connects the space object 
to the identity of the responsible party.  Liability Convention, supra note 52, at art. X.  For example, it 
is nearly impossible to establish the origination of a bolt after hypervelocity impacts.  Kessler & 
Cour-Palais, supra note 92, at 2639.  A more effective treaty would address the actual creation of debris.  
Timothy Joseph Trapp, Note, Taking Up Space By Any Other Means: Coming to Terms With the 
Nonappropriation Article of the Outer Space Treaty, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1681, 1693 (2013). 
115. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, at art. 9. 
116. See Benefits Declaration, supra note 23, at ¶ 2 (“States are free to determine all aspects of 
their participation in international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space on an equitable 
and mutually acceptable basis.”); Krause, supra note 51, at 48 (“[I]ncreasingly, nations are enacting 
legislation and regulations for commercial space activity.  ‘Space law is at the jagged edge between 
legislative and executive power[.]’”).  The European Space Agency, while not a sovereign nation, has 
ratified the provisions of the Liability Convention, Rescue Agreement, and Registration Convention.  
COPUOS, Fifty-Seventh, supra note 17, at 10. 
117. However, some scholars suggest that this multifarious body of national and international 
space law could work as the foundation for a workable mitigation regime.  Shackelford, Governing the 
Final Frontier, supra note 6 at 433–34, 433 n.30. 
118. Compare HANNEKE VAN TRAA-ENGELMANN, COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION OF OUTER 
SPACE: LAW AND PRACTICE 5–6 (1993) (“Preconditioned by the international and even universal 
nature of outer space affairs, it was self-evident that international relations were bound to play a leading 
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At the dawn of civilized society, depending on a particular jurisdiction’s 
values, the laws of nature and morality compelled obedience and social 
order.119  When nation-states concluded international agreements, it 
represented the coalescence of the various values-based systems, the overlap 
of which formed a universal understanding of the law of mankind.120  
“[The] fundamental conceptual boundary between municipal and 
international law . . . view[s] international law largely in terms of contractual 
relations, therefore assigning to the ‘sovereign’ a central place in the 
construction of the two orders.”121  In other words, transnational 
cooperation operated through balancing the competing autonomy and 
values of the parties involved.  Despite centuries of debate, values systems 
remain the principal motivating factor of compliance with international 
law.122  Effective regulatory regimes must, therefore, strike at the heart of 
what nation-states value the most, which is often related to national 
security.123 
When entering an international agreement, whether or not a nation-state 
will ratify it informs us of the value a nation-state places on the instrument’s 
subject matter.  That value equates to the utility a nation-state places on 
certain allowances or prohibitions.124  Incorporating these motivating 
 
role in the regulation of the fourth environment and man’s activities therein.”), with Harold Hongju 
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2600 (1997) (“[I]f we cannot predict 
when nation-states will carry out their international legal obligations respecting trade retaliation, 
environmental protection, human rights, global security, and supranational organizations, how can we 
count on ‘multilateralism[.]’”). 
119. Koh, supra note 118, at 2604–05 (detailing the religious influence on early legal systems). 
120. However, the free-will of humanity explains the varied systems of law among nation-states.  
Id. at 2606–07 (marking Hugo Grotius’ declarations of free will as the proverbial wedge driven between 
sovereign concerns and those of the international community). 
121. Id. at 2607. 
122. See Terry Nardin, International Ethics and International Law, 18 REV. INT’L STUD. 19, 23–24 
(1992) (“[C]ustomary international law reflects the inevitably plural character of international society 
and may be said to constitute a morality of states, one that is a morality of coexistence.”).  Three schools 
of thought interpret the probability of compliance with international law.  Koh, supra note 118, 
at 2632–34.  First, various rational choice theories proffer that compliance hinges on whether the 
regulatory scheme will further the self-interest of parties involved.  Id. at 2632–33.  Second, liberal 
international relations theories consider well-defined democratic institutions as the preferred 
mechanism of enforcing rights and obligations.  Id. at 2633.  Third constructivism advances the theory 
that rules and normative values are a direct reflection of the evolution of social interaction and shared 
ideas which validate mechanisms ensuring peace and security.  Id. at 2633–34. 
123. Id. at 2658 (concluding that international regulatory schemes that cause nation-states to 
internalize the object and purpose of an agreement as the best means to bolster adherence). 
124. The Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocols on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer became the first treaty body in world history to achieve universal ratification.  Most-Ratified 
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factors with Hardin’s regulatory solution, any freedoms infringed upon must 
manifest a higher utility than currently realized.  If COPUOS proposes a 
protocol for sustainable uses of space, the provisions must either have a 
negligible effect on the global community’s perceived utility of space access 
or substantially increase that utility.  Assuming the propositioned regulatory 
scheme aligns with the values system of each nation-state, the probability of 
internalizing such regulations through domestic codification is high. 
To ascertain the interests of nation-states, we must look to the factors 
motivating current space utilization.  Routine access to space undeniably 
aids our technological advancement.  The ISS’s antigravity environment 
provides unique conditions to study medicine.125  Satellites provide 
real-time tracking of environmental conditions and transmit crucial 
information for disaster recovery planning.126  Space telescopes track 
objects with the potential to cause the extinction of life of Earth.127  Free 
from the veil of our hazy atmosphere, satellites can produce better imagery 
and ascertain the composition of potential resource deposits on celestial 
bodies.128  And simply receiving satellite imagery of our planet forces us to 
confront the realities of our fragile existence.  These benefits signify the 
tangible realization of the OST’s object and purpose, which flow to all 
 
International Treaties, U.N. BLOG (Sept. 24, 2012), https://blogs.un.org/blog/2012/09/24/most-
ratified-international-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/VT72-8QPV].  Beyond a reasonable doubt, 
humanity values the integrity of the atmosphere and will make sacrifices to protect its utility. 
125. ISS experiments have led to advances in treatments for osteoporosis and muscular 
pathologies, as well as the cardiovascular side-effects from radiation exposure, a fatal byproduct of 
long-term space travel currently preventing us from becoming a multiplanetary species.  Comm. on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of Rep. of Sci. & Tech. Subcomm. on Its Thirty-Fifth Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/697, at 28 (1998).  The technology behind the Canadian Space  
Agency’s Canadarm2 robotic arm, which captures resupply vessels, is utilized in the removal of 
once-inoperable tumors.  15 Ways the International Space Station is Benefitting Earth, NAT’L AERONAUTICS 
 & SPACE ADMIN. (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/research/news/15
_ways_iss_benefits_earth [https://perma.cc/D877-8F8L]. 
126. Earth observation satellites impart more precise prediction of natural disasters allowing for 
more effective disaster mitigation and evacuation planning.  NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., 
supra note 125. 
127. See generally Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of Sci. & Tech. Subcomm. 
on Its Fiftieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.330 (2013) (reporting the active and planned 
satellite missions tracking near-Earth objects).  
128. Planetary Resources’ ARKYD satellite platform mission seeks to identify the composition 
of resources on near-Earth asteroids.  The ARKYD Spacecraft Development Platform, PLANETARY 
RESOURCES (2015) https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3273&context=sm 
allsat [https://perma.cc/47V9-NAVF]. 
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members of the global community.129  If we do not begin active 
decontamination and mitigation of space debris, the utility of geospace will 
cease to exist.  Imagining our existence without these advances is a potent 
method to stress the criticality of unabated pollution in geospace. 
B. Existing Proposals 
Legal scholars have formulated several frameworks to mitigate space 
debris.  Some recommend implementing a market-share liability regime, 
which assigns liability according to the volume of each nation-states’ 
exploits.130  Opponents of this construction rightfully highlight the 
inequities inherent in such a scheme.  Considering the United States, Russia, 
and China make up the bulk of spacefaring activity, market-share liability 
would unduly burden these nations, and coerce a categorical exit from the 
space industry or a repeat of the Moon Treaty.131  Another scholar 
advocates for an environmental law approach, asserting that the space 
commons would benefit from a protocol closely mirroring the Madrid 
Protocol.132  While prospective applications of such a model could prevent 
additional accumulations, it would not feasibly abate the current collection 
of debris.133  The strengths of Mary Button’s mitigation proposal lie in the 
binding nature of the Madrid Protocol and compulsory environmental 
impact requirements.  And though it advocates for a more collaborative 
conference mechanism, rather than the strict unanimous consent required 
of UNCOPUOS’s resolutions, it still shies away from compulsory 
 
129. See, e.g., G.A. Res. A/RES/61/110, United Nations Platform for Space-Based Information 
for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (Jan. 15, 2007) (implementing UN-SPIDER to 
foster satellite information sharing with developing nations to increase disaster mitigation capacities). 
130. E.g., Peter L. Limperis, Note, Orbital Debris and the Spacefaring Nations: International Law 
Methods for Prevention and Reduction of Debris, and Liability Remines for Damage Cause by Debris, 15 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 319, 342 (1998). 
131. Cf. Landry, supra note 6, at 525 (“No state or private entity has been willing to bear the 
enormous cost of commercialization in part because international law prohibits nation and, potentially, 
private appropriation, and even if the laws are interpreted to allow private appropriate, they require 
private entities to share some unclear quantity of returns (‘benefits’) with every state on Earth.”). 
132. Button, supra note 3, at 563 (proffering that the compulsory environmental impact 
assessment framework of the Madrid Protocol could act as a viable enforcement mechanism for any 
planning space launch). 
133. The Madrid Protocol obligates parties to remove the waste attributable to their activity in 
Antarctica.  Madrid Protocol, supra note 18, at annex III & art. 1.  In geospace, despite the Registration 
Convention, debris smaller than ten centimeters cannot be tracked or identifiably connected to a 
responsible party, yet still has the potential to start a destructive chain reaction.  Space Waste & Debris, 
supra note 75. 
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requirements for active debris removal.  Along with the Antarctic Treaty 
(ATS), the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also served as a model for the Corpus 
Juris Spatialis.  But oddly, the law of salvage was omitted from the treaties.  
Unlike abandoned objects at sea, once a nation-state places an object into 
space, ownership exists in perpetuity.  Sandra Drago addressed removing 
the OST’s property-in-perpetuity mechanism134 so as to permit the active 
salvage of inoperable satellites.135  Drago’s proposal is vital to any 
mitigation framework.  But while this removes a substantial bar currently 
restricting debris removal, it does not address free-riding, and spacefaring 
enterprises are free to choose more lucrative space activities other than 
salvage operations.136  
C. A Coercive Proposal 
Mutual coercion lies at the core of Hardin’s solution.137  To summarize, 
law-abiding citizens make concessions to regulatory social constructs in the 
interest of conserving some utility otherwise lost.138  The coercive element 
lies in relinquishing one’s ability to exploit some freedom, the detriment of 
which cannot be realized at that moment in time.139  Conceding to a regime 
that tempers free exploitation of the commons allows everyone to benefit 
from the positive externalities of individual usage.  Equated to space, 
nation-states currently concede to non-appropriation in the interest of 
maintaining equitable access.  But because of the sui generis nature of 
geospace, even non-participants receive a benefit from the use of the 
 
134. See Emily M. Nevala, Waste in Space: Remediating Space Debris Through the Doctrine of 
Abandonment and the Law of Capture, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1495, 1520 n.160 (2017) (“Article VIII of the 
Outer Space Treaty allows jurisdiction and control over space objects so long as they remain in space, 
but at the same time it seems to grant ownership rights in perpetuity.”). 
135. Sandra Drago, Note, No Man’s Sky: Utilizing Maritime Law to Address the Need for Space Debris 
Removal Technology, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 389, 419 (2019). 
136. Cf. id. at 419–21 (discussing salvage awards as an incentive to clean up space debris).  One 
sharp criticism to Drago’s proposal is the promise of SpaceX’s innovation.  If anything, SpaceX is 
exacerbating the danger of debris proliferation with the StarLink satellite internet constellation.  Apart 
from SpaceX, the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015 authorized the commercial 
recovery of asteroid resources as long as such is acquired in accordance with the OST, which will prove 
lucrative with the requisite technological capabilities.  Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act 
of 2015, Pub. L. 114-90, 129 Stat. 721, 722 (disclaiming any extension of extraterritorial sovereignty 
implicated through activities authorized by the act). 
137. Hardin, supra note 6, at 1247. 
138. Id. at 1248. 
139. See Demsetz, supra note 114, at 349 (“It is the prohibition of a property right adjustment, 
the prohibition of the establishment of an ownership title that can henceforth be exchanged, that 
precludes the internalization of external costs and benefits.”). 
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commons.  In effect, beneficiaries are free-riding from the capital 
investment of spacefaring nations and entities.  This informs the structure 
of the ensuing two-part framework: geospace delimitation and global 
liability. 
1. Geospace Delimitation 
The history of regulatory delimitation illustrates its effectiveness at 
balancing the rights of individuals, sovereigns, and mankind.  Each instance 
explained in Part II infra, arose out of public necessity to ensure and protect 
the maximum utility of the global commons, without the deleteriousness of 
inhabitability, sovereign interference, or over-exploitation.140  The regimes 
governing Antarctica, the High Seas, the Atmosphere, and the 
radio-frequency spectrum evidence that mutually coercive delimitation can 
honor the common heritage of mankind, without encroaching on the 
peaceful enjoyment and benefits attributable to these areas. 
a. Antarctica 
In the 1950s, there was concern that Antarctica would succumb to 
Cold War hysteria, becoming a target for international discord and nuclear 
arms testing.141  In a move to reestablish global scientific exchange, the 
international scientific community hosted the International Geophysical 
Year project, and after identifying the potential of Antarctica, sought to 
protect it from any ruinous power posturing.142  This necessity for 
regulating permissible activity resulted in the formation of the ATS.143  
Subsequent technological advancement revealed mineral deposits, triggering 
 
140. Part of Garrett Hardin’s thesis emphasizes necessity as the catalyst for regulatory solutions: 
Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement of somebody’s personal liberty.  
Infringements made in the distant past are accepted because no contemporary complains of a 
loss.  It is the newly proposed infringements that we vigorously oppose; cries of “rights” and 
“freedom: fill the air.  But what does “freedom” mean?  When men mutually agreed to pass laws 
against robbing, mankind became more free, not less so.  Individuals locked into the logic of the 
commons are free only to bring on universal ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion, 
they become free to pursue other goals. 
Hardin, supra note 6, at 1248. 
141. Seven countries have attempted to claim sovereignty over Antarctica, but these claims were 
suspended at the conclusion of the ATS.  Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, 
Antarctic Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/193967.htm [https://perma. 
cc/78VE-4LLA]. 
142. Id. 
143. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. 
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commercial interest in exploiting its natural resources.  The threat catalyzed 
the promulgation of the Madrid Protocol.144  Again, these delimitations did 
not sever humanity’s utility in Antarctica.  Rather, mankind conceded to the 
prohibition of deleterious usage in the interest of preserving its scientific 
utility.145 
b. The High Seas 
Similar to Antarctica, the High Seas faced threats in the 1960s when 
nation-states began unilaterally and arbitrarily, extending resource recovery 
activities further into the depths of international waters.146  In the interest 
of equity, particularly the interests of landlocked nations, UNCLOS 
delimited sovereign access to the seas, allowing usage only within the 
established exclusive economic zones (EEZs).147  An annex to UNCLOS 
provided a procedural framework in which resource recovery enterprises 
could operate in international common areas beyond the EEZs, precluding 
the unilateral capture of global resources by one nation.148  Once more, a 
mutually coercive framework removed certain freedoms in the interest of 
mankind without unjustly limiting equitable access to resources. 
c. The Atmosphere 
Divergent from the problems of the ice and sea, atmospheric regulation 
resolved an issue more analogous to geospace debris proliferation.  
Atmospheric utility is quite simple: breathable air and protection from 
deadly cosmic radiation.  When satellite imagery revealed the sizable hole in 
the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention placed an 
 
144. Madrid Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 7. 
145. Antarctica’s frozen territory contains a time capsule of in situ climate data, playing  
a valuable role in climate change models.  Why Study Antarctica?, ANTARCTICA N.Z., 
http://www.antarcticanz.govt.nz/science/why-study-antarctica/ [https://perma.cc/N3SU-N78A].  
The Madrid Protocol provisions contain conservation mechanisms, such as compulsory environmental 
impact assessment requirements for planned expeditions to the region.  Madrid Protocol, supra note 18, 
at art. 3. 
146. Ian Hedges, Note, How the Rest was Won: Creating a Universally Beneficial Legal Regime for 
Space-Based Natural Resource Utilization, 40 VT. L. REV. 365, 384–85 (2015). 
147. UNCLOS, supra note 36, at pt. V art. 57. 
148. G.A. Res. 48/263, supra note 83.  It should be noted that this annex remains unratified by 
the United States for the same reasons the Moon Treaty failed.  Law of the Sea Convention, U.S. STATE 
DEPT. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.state.gov/law-of-the-sea-convention/ [https://perma.cc/45ZW-
TU57].  Sovereign claims to tangible natural resources in global common areas remains a contentious 
issue. 
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outright ban on ozone-depleting chemicals in everyday consumables.149  
This prohibition directly addressed the source of the negative externality, 
forcing humanity to internalize the externality through alternate investment 
in refrigerants.  Recent evidence of the reduction of ozone loss validates the 
mutually coercive delimitation within the Montreal Protocol.150 
d. Regulating the Telecommunication Spectrum 
The business model and financial strategy of telecommunications entities 
influence satellite deployment planning.  Typically, orbital placement aims 
to “maximize [a] potential user base,” and if that base happens to 
encompass, for instance, the continental United States, market competition 
drastically narrows the availability of slots for satellite positioning.151  
Realizing that satellite acquisition becomes moot without conscientious “use 
of telemetry and control . . . required for spaceflight,”152 the Space 
Radiocommunication Conference convened to revise the Radio Regulations 
in 1963,153 granting the ITU authority to allocate radio frequencies among 
spacefaring entities.154  Originally, the ITU: 
[A]llocated orbits and frequencies solely through a first-in-time system.  This 
led to concern that developed countries would secure all of the available slots 
before developing countries had the technological capacity to use them.  
Although some orbits and frequencies are still allocated on a first-in-time 
basis, each state is now guaranteed a certain number of future orbits and 
frequencies, regardless of its current technological capacity.155 
 
149. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, T.I.A.S. 
No. 89-101, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.  
150. Though difficult to ascertain whether the reduction of ozone loss directly resulted from 
ozone-depleting chemical prohibition, such should not discount the international community’s 
compliance with production phase-out measures.  Michael Carlowicz, Measurements Show  
Reduction in Ozone-Eating Chemicals, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/91694/measurements-show-reduction-in-ozone-eating-
chemical [https://perma.cc/T3EY-CUHY]. 
151. Roberts, supra note 66, at 1102.  For example, NOAA’s GOES satellites provide weather 
information and can act as a rescue beacon.  Three Classes of Orbit, supra note 68. 
152. Doyle, supra note 37, at 12–13. 
153. Radio Conference on Space Communications: Rewarding Results, 30 TELECOMM. J. 366, 366 (1963). 
154. The frequency at which space craft, satellites, and other object can operate without 
disruptive interference is limited.  Overview of ITU’s History, ITU 2 (Jan. 3, 2019), http://search.itu.int/ 
history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/12.28.71.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ2P-S24F].   
155. SPRANKLING, supra note 113, at 191. 
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The FCC regulates the segment of the electromagnetic spectrum allocated 
to the United States.156  Arguably, the ITU and agencies like the FCC 
engage in de facto appropriation of the more highly sought-after orbits.157  
Yet to an extent, the ITU’s delimiting of the radio-frequency spectrum 
remedied the negative externalities of non-appropriation in geospace, such 
as the overcrowding of active satellites and the resultant interference.  Where 
the ITU’s scheme does not remedy the byproduct of geospace resource use, 
it succeeds in ensuring communication capabilities remain free from 
inequitable use.158 
e. The OST’s Ineffective Delimitations 
The recurrent theme among the aforementioned regulatory schemes is 
the preservation of utility within the commons concerned.159  The 
frameworks each provide a means to enjoy shared resources while removing 
the potential for destruction.  The OST’s nonproliferation provisions 
properly regulate the usage of the space commons to further the enjoyment 
of space’s true utility: scientific discovery and telecommunications.  
Likewise, the Liability Convention reinforces the necessity to maintain 
heightened situational awareness to guarantee the mutual, uninterrupted 
enjoyment of activity in space.160  But nation-states exploit the  
loop-holes within these documents to avoid internalizing some of their 
externalities.  Specifically, the Liability Convention only assigns liability  
for damage caused to space objects when fault can actually be  
 
156. 47 C.F.R. § 25.108 (2019). 
157. Rob Frieden, Balancing Equity and Efficiency Issues in the Management of Shared Global 
Radiocommunication Resources, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 289, 321 (2003). 
158. See Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Const. art. 1(2)(a), adopted by Plenipotentiary Conference 
(Minneapolis, 1998) (“[ITU] shall . . . effect allocation of bands of the radio-frequency spectrum, the 
allotment of radio frequencies and the registration of radio-frequency assignments and, for space 
services, of any associated orbital position in the geostationary-satellite orbit or of any associated 
characteristics of satellites in other orbits, in order to avoid harmful interference[.]”). 
159. One could argue that minerals are the true utility of Antarctica.  This view fails to realize 
that those resources simply remain because the consultative parties have yet to reach a consensus on 
an equitable framework for mining enterprises.  The utility of a commons protected under the common 
heritage of mankind principle requires equitable benefit sharing.  So, the delimitation of resource usage 
in Antarctica merely operates to prohibit remorseless extraction of shared resources.  Hardin, supra 
note 6, at 1244. 
160. See Liability Convention, supra note 52, at pmbl. (“Recalling the [OST], . . . 
[and r]ecognizing the need to elaborate effective international rules and procedures concerning liability 
for damage caused by space objects[.]”). 
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determined.161  Though it would be simple to assign fault to a collision 
caused by an intact and inoperative satellite, it is virtually impossible to 
identify the owner of smaller pieces of debris.  Further, while the ITU 
reserves slots for nations not represented in space,162 it does nothing to 
stop those capable of reaching geospace from littering the commons and 
destroying the utility of reserved slots.163  Holistically, none of the 
delimitations in the Corpus Juris Spatialis negate the cause of the growing belt 
of debris in geospace. 
As a sui generis resource, the mere occupation of LEO or GSO equates to 
the reduction of the overall utility of geospace.  When an entity launches a 
rocket into space, the accompanying payload causes either (1) temporary 
reduction of the aggregate utility of geospace or (2) permanent reduction of 
the aggregate utility of geospace.164 
The first delimitation prong will recommend bifurcating the applicability 
of the Corpus Juris Spatialis, with separate regimes for outer space and 
geospace.  While the commercialization of outer space is not overly injurious 
to the international commons or interests of developing nations, the 
overcrowding of affluent spacefaring entities vying for orbital acquisition 
puts immense pressure on the finite resources within geospace.  Therefore, 
demarcating the upper limit of geospace will allow entities to continue 
exploring the universe without imposing the restrictions placed on those 
seeking geospace positioning.165  This modification will allow continued 
 
161. Id. at art. III.  Article II assigns absolute liability for “damage caused by its space object on 
the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight,” which adequately addresses space debris on reentry.  Id. 
at art. II. 
162. SPRANKLING, supra note 113, at 191. 
163. See Tyler A. Way, The Space Gap, Access to Technology, and the Perpetuation of Poverty, 5 INT’L 
RESEARCHSCAPE J. no. 7, 2018, at *3–4 (discussing a 2017 study of the Union of Concerned Scientists 
which found that for every satellite a developing nation launched, the United States, China, and Russia 
launched three satellites in aggregate).  In the event that international cooperation cannot convene an 
agreement to promulgate a binding mitigation regime, the value of a developed nation’s reserved orbital 
slots are substantially devalued.  Cf. Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Law and Economics, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 411, 412 (1977) (arguing for legal enforcement of gratuitous promises because to do 
otherwise significantly decreases the value and overall utility of a promise). 
164. Most of the material jettisoned from rocket stages fall back to Earth, burning up in the 
atmosphere on re-entry, but not all.  Space Waste & Debris, supra note 75. 
165. It is pertinent that there be language permitting additional bifurcations, should it ever 
become necessary.  For instance, the imminent James Webb Space Telescope, the successor of the 
Hubble Space Telescope, will be placed at the second Lagrange point, an orbital position that fixes the 
telescope in the shadows of the Moon so Earth blocks the Sun, keeping mission-critical infrared 
instruments from overheating.  Comparison: Webb vs Hubble Telescope, NASA, https://jwst.nasa.gov/ 
content/about/comparisonWebbVsHubble.html [https://perma.cc/DRR3-LZM6]. 
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use of both regions, but coerce more sustainable usage of geospace with the 
assistance of the secondary prong below. 
2. Global Liability 
Operating under the theory that humanity holds an implied property right 
in the global commons but limited under the non-appropriation clause to 
protect those interests through traditional property mechanisms, the logical 
alternative is to impose liability on actions violative of the global interest.166  
Further, assuming humanity collectively benefits from utilization of this 
commons, then humanity likewise must internalize the cost of the negative 
externalities imposed.167  This means that spacefarers, as members of the 
global collective, hold both the right and obligation to protect that right for 
others.168  Therefore, anyone utilizing or benefitting from the utilization of 
the geospace commons has an equitable duty to ensure its sustainability.  
Under traditional tort theories, when one has a duty, breach of that duty 
causally linked to a measurable injury is actionable.  In terms of the duty to 
humanity when utilizing geospace, the culmination of Kessler Syndrome 
represents the measurable injury. 
Kessler informed the scientific community in 1970 of the probable 
cataclysmic chain-reaction and destructive conclusion of unabated geospace 
debris pollution.169  This theory, reiterated consistently since its 
 
166. Under Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s property and liability rules, a nuisance 
claim under property regimes entitles the interest holder the grant of injunction; liability rules allow the 
nuisance to continue but requires a payment of damages to the injured party.  James E. Krier & Stewart 
J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 442–
43 (1995). 
167. The collective right to share in the benefits of a global commons comes with a reciprocal 
obligation: 
[T]he common heritage of mankind principle is not solely about benefit sharing. [It] is just as 
much about conservation and preservation. The principle is about solidarity; solidarity in the 
preservation and conservation of a good we all share and therefore should protect. But also 
solidarity in ensuring that this good, which we all share, is for all our benefit. 
Aline Jaeckel et al., Conserving the Common Heritage of Mankind – Options for the Deep-Seabed Mining Regime, 
78 MARINE POL’Y 150, 150 (2017) (quoting D. Tladi, The Common Heritage of Mankind and the Proposed 
Treaty on Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: The Choice Between Pragmatism and Sustainability, 
25 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 113 (2015)). 
168. Id. 
169. Theoretically, even if we stopped traveling to space, Kessler Syndrome could still 
materialize without active reduction of existing debris.  See Kessler & Cour-Palais, supra note 92, at 2642 
(“With time, enough collisional fragments could be produced to become important in producing new 
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dissemination, materialized in 2009.170  Fundamentally, every spacefaring 
entity and approving launching state knows of this monumental threat to 
the utility of geospace.  Yet to date, mitigation guidelines remain 
non-binding, and four-figure satellite constellations continue to receive 
approval.171  To incorporate a time-honored risk calculation method, the 
Hand Formula is instructive and evidences a trend toward unapologetic 
endangerment to the utility of geospace in isolation of the associated tort 
regime. 
Let us assume the burden to mitigate space debris is $18.5 million172 but 
the probable magnitude of not mitigating the accumulation of space debris 
equates to reverting our technological capabilities back to the 1800s.  
Considering the accumulation of debris from the accidental or intentional 
breakup of geospace satellites, the probability of Kessler Syndrome fully 
concluding in the absence of a comprehensive mitigation protocol is one 
hundred percent.173  While difficult to quantify, the value of our scientific 
progress attributable to the advent of space travel far outstrips the burden 
to mitigate space debris.  Should Kessler Syndrome become our reality, the 
measurable injury is the cost of reestablishing global communications 
without the usage of satellite relays.  To add insult to injury, the invaluable 
utility of geospace will cease to exist. 
A viable alternative would institute a regime of shared global liability 
which makes consideration of capital investors as well as nonparticipating 
beneficiaries in the interest of equity.  That is, should the inevitable prison 
 
collisional fragments. When these conditions apply, the number of objects will increase exponentially 
with time, even though no new objects may be place into orbit by man.”). 
170. The IRIDIUM 33 and COSMOS 2251 collision marked the first accidental collision, 
though several malfunctioning satellites have previously exploded.  Additionally, a Chinese anti-satellite 
test created intentional debris in 2007.  By May 2010, ten separate incidents produced 7,903 pieces of 
trackable debris, with thousands more too small to catalogue.  The fact that accidental collisions are 
occurring within a four year margin of Kessler’s prediction is chilling.  NASA’s Orbital Debris Program 
Office, Top Ten Satellite Breakups, 14 ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, no. 3, at 2–3 (2010). 
171. See supra, text accompanying note 72. 
172. Launched in March 2018, European Space Agency’s RemoveDEBRIS satellite, the first to 
test debris removal technology, cost $18.5 million.  Tony Reichhardt, SpaceX Cargo Ship Will Carry First 
Test of Space Debris Cleanup, AIR & SPACE (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.airspacemag.com/daily-
planet/first-test-space-debris-cleanup-about-get-under-way-180968631/ [https://perma.cc/2STJ-AU 
3Z]. 
173. See Kessler & Cour-Palais, supra note 92, at 2642 (“With time, enough collisional fragments 
could be produced to become important in producing new collisional fragments. When these 
conditions apply, the number of objects will increase exponentially with time, even though no new 
objects may be place into orbit by man.”). 
35
Vollmer: The Right Stuff in Geospace
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
806 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:771 
for humanity become a reality, the entire global community will be liable to 
pay an equitable share of the overall cost of recovery efforts.174  The 
Liability Convention should undergo a similar trifurcation, adding this new 
scheme to the current strict and absolute liability mechanisms.175  As such, 
shared global liability will consider the responsibility of nation-states and 
private entities in isolation.176  This will coerce cooperation among all 
agencies, nations, and private entities because the equitable share of 
responsibility will drive collective resolution. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
In light of the emerging global sentiments regarding environmental 
conservation and sustainability, instituting a regime that clearly defines a 
legal consequence in the event of environmental ruin boasts greater coercive 
force than non-binding resolutions.  It appropriately delimits the permissible 
uses of geospace without removing any level of utility appurtenant to the 
geospace commons.  It allows all activity to continue, but with a measurable 
consequence that will influence behavior, which will flow positively to all of 
mankind.  This international agreement aligns with the universal value that 
the international community places on the utility of geospace.177  In 
 
174. To clarify, this will not be the holistic cost of restoring the full utility of geospace to a tabula 
rasa, but certainly the cost of reestablishing a workable communications network and recovery 
program.  Additionally, special allowances will be afforded to entities whom actively participate in the 
research and development of mitigation and sustainable technology, such as the ESA, for its efforts 
with RemoveDEBRIS and SpaceX for its reusable rocket platform.  Reichhardt, supra note 172.  Ideally, 
for the least developed nations, equitable solutions beyond the scope of this Comment would balance 
the benefits received and level of involvement in space technology endeavors. 
175. The outcome of the Iridium-Cosmos incident is unclear principally due to the flexibility of 
the Liability Convention’s fault regime.  See generally von der Dunk, supra note 12 (discussing the 
difficulties of assigning liability for satellite collision due to vagaries within the Liability Convention 
and failure to comply with the Registration Convention). 
176. At current, liability is determined by identifying the “launching state” responsible for a 
particular space object.  Liability Convention, supra note 52, art. I(c).  Accordingly, a nation-state is 
responsible for any space object launched from its jurisdiction, subject to indemnity and liability 
waivers that are beyond the scope of this Comment.  But, removing the shield of the state will further 
coerce private entities to actively remedy the debris crisis. 
177. Interestingly, the ISS provides no direct monetary revenue and all capital investment is a 
sunk cost.  The return on investment is not represented in financial gain but the scientific discoveries 
realized from the activities within.  This evidences that it is not unrealistic to assume that the global 
community will allocate funds for debris mitigation.  Though a categorically sunk cost, our investment 
secures our continued enjoyment of the geospace commons for generations to come.  The 
technological advancement likely to flow from this focus bolsters the argument that complete 
ratification is possible. 
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essence, it protects geospace by forcing the signatory to face the reality of 
their negative externalities.  It is unlikely that a nation-state exists that does 
not value space exploration and the benefits attributable. 
In April of 2019, in the spirit of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), COPUOS adopted an agenda that focused on the long-term 
sustainability of the space commons, space traffic management, equitable 
uses of GSO, and the mitigation of space debris.178  Mindful of space’s 
critical role in attaining many of the SDGs, the Committee put forth 
guidelines to facilitate capacity building without prejudice to any one 
nation-states’ economic capabilities.  To be sure, the Guidelines for the 
Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities are an important step 
forward, but many delegates reiterated the importance of developing 
binding instruments, particularly in light of developments in “space resource 
exploitation, large constellations, and space debris remediation.”179 
Looking forward, research continues to advance the availability of debris 
mitigation mechanisms, such as the European Space Agency’s 
newly-commissioned ClearSpace-1 satellite.180  Mission objectives 
increasingly include end-of-life procedures to place satellites in appropriate 
orbits to decrease clutter in areas where active satellites operate.181  In the 
context of private entities, Planetary Resources—originally positioned to 
become a principle player in the space mining industry—merged with 
Consensys Space and quickly launched TruSat, a crowd-sourced situational 
awareness forum that compiles the reports of private citizens to track 
objects in geospace.182  These developments instill confidence in the 
international community’s sentiments toward ameliorating this 
 
178. COPUOS, Sixty-Second, supra note 4. 
179. See id. at 26 (“[A]lthough non-legally binding instruments had been a success in that they 
had guided States in conducting their activities in outer space in a safe and secure manner, they should 
not replace treaties and custom as the valuable sources of international law that they are.”). 
180. ESA Commissions World’s First Space Debris Removal, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Clean_Space/ESA_commissions_world_s_first_space_debris_
removal [https://perma.cc/JU4M-C4DS]. 
181. The ITU now requires that satellites commence transition into decay or graveyard orbits 
at the end of its functional life, a principle echoed in the ODMSP standards.  Recommendation ITU-R 
S.1003-2, at 1 (Dec. 2010). 
182. TruSat as a Space Sustainability Tool, CONSENSYS SPACE: TRUSAT, https://learn.trusat.org/ 
docs/space-sustainability [https://perma.cc/L6UQ-QBCF] (“Private commercial providers of SSA 
data rely on satellite operators for their revenue and do not have incentives for calling out non-
conforming orbital behavior.  TruSat is designed to fill this gap through a new approach to SSA 
uncoupled from government or commercial interests.”).  Anyone with an augmented-reality-equipped 
smart phone can contribute to TruSat’s mission. 
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ever-approaching catastrophe.  It is with great hope that this trend 
continues, and COPUOS promulgates binding regulations to ensure the 
sustainability of geospace for the common heritage of mankind.  “But we 
can never do nothing.  That which we have done for thousands of years is 
also action.  It also produces evils.”183 
  
 
183. Hardin, supra note 6, at 1247. 
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VI.    APPENDIX 
 
 
NASA rendering of space debris.  The objects obscuring Earth are those 
in LEO.  The faint outer line represents objects in the geosynchronous orbit 
subtype of geostationary orbit.184 
  
 
184. NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Space Debris, NAT’L AERONAUTICS &  
SPACE ADMIN. (Sept. 11, 2009), https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/40173/space-debris 
[https://perma.cc/X3S6-FKR9]. 
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